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ABSTRACT 
United States-Department of Energy (DOE) sites that store transuranic (TRU) waste are almost 
certain to encounter waste packages with characteristics that are so unique as to warrant special 
precautions for retrieval. At the Hanford Site, a subgroup of stored TRU waste (12 drums) had 
special considerations due to the radioactive source content of plutonium oxide (PuO~), and the 
potential for high heat generation, pressurization, criticality, and high radiation. These 
characteristics bear on the approach to safely retrieve, overpack, vent, store, and transport the 
waste package. Because of the potential risk to personnel, contingency planning for unexpected 
conditions played an effective role in work planning and in preparing workers for the field 
inspection activity. As a result, the integrity inspections successfully confirmed waste package 
configuration and waste confinement without experiencing any perturbations due to 
unanticipated packaging conditions. This paper discusses the engineering and field approach to 
managing the risk of retrieving TRU waste with unique characteristics. 
INTRODUCTION 
Suspect TRU wastes have been retrievably stored in the Hanford Site Low Level Burial Grounds (LLBG) 
kom 1970 through the 1980s. Fluor Hanford, Inc. has undertaken the Waste Retrieval Project to retrieve 
4,200 m3 of suspect TRU waste from the LLBG by September 30,2006. 
A subgroup of this waste, 12 drums, had unique characteristics that were outside the current typical drum 
removal activities. These 12 drums contain various isotopes of plutonium along with the decay products 
of Am-241 and U-234, all in oxide form. Because of the high percentage of Pu-238, these drums were 
referred to as the Hanford Pu-238 drums. Of particular interest was the condition of the dnun, the 
concentric containers in the drum, and the oxide contained in the inner-most container. Evaluation of the 
concentric containers was needed to develop a specific plan for the safe removal of these 12 drums. 
The LLBG consists of trenches where waste in various sized packages is stored for future removal and 
processing. The particular trench where the 12 drums were stored is made up of modules that are 
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equivalent to a horizontal array of 12 by 12,208-L drums that are vertically stacked four tiers high. 
Plywood separates each tier. A tarp covers the entire stacked array from top to bottom. A final layer of 
plywcmd covers the tarp and approximately 1.2 m of soil covers the final layer of plywood. 
Field measurements were needed to assess that (1) the Pu-238 drum's confinement condition had not been 
significantly altered as a result of drum service; (2) the package configuration was as described in the 
Calculations for the Hanford Pu-238 Drums [I]; and (3) the package was contact handled retrievably 
stored waste. The field effort was referred to as the Pu-238 Drum Integrity Inspection and was designed 
to affirm container integrity as follow-on to the engineering assessment reported in Reference 1. 
The field assessment approach was to use standard waste retrieval methods for uncovering the dnun(s) 
and use off-the-shelf nondestructive examination technologies that could be safely deployed in the LLBG 
trench and provide a reasonable expectation of useful data for imaging, radiation, and tempkrature. Even 
though the drum integrity assessment [2] predicted that the Pu confinement barriers should be intact, there 
was a remote possibility that confinement may have been lost. Since personnel safety was paramount, 
contingencies were analyzed and responses specific to the hazards of the Pu-238 drum inspection 
activities were developed during the Preliminary Hazards Analysis, the job-specific Automated Job 
Hazard Analysis, and the Unreviewed Safety Question process. 
DRUM STORAGE 
Each of the 12 drums contains a shipping container that was assembled at the Savannah River Site (SRS) 
in 1966 and shipped to Hanford where the dnuns were stored above-ground for approximately 14 years. 
In 1980, the drums were buried in the LLBG. The container packaging consists of multiple, 
concentrically nested containers. The PuOz was sealed in two, nested aluminum cans that were enclosed 
in a staidess steel source capsule. The source capsule was positioned in a carbon steel shipping container 
with the annulus filled with aluminum pellets. The shipping container was centered in a 208-L drum by 
means of a birdcage type structure as illustrated in Figure 1. Knowledge of the package configuration 
was based on a combination of incomplete historical drawings and correspondence. 
The 12 drums were buried in 1980 on the top tier of one of the LLBG modules. The 12 drums were 
spaced to meet the requirements for heat dissipation. To complete the array, other 208-L waste drums 
were placed around the 12 dnuns on tier 4 and the tiers below as illustrated in Figure 2. 
TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The engineering analyses showed a low probability of the confinement failing. Yet, the high 
consequences of a failed container to the safety of the workers during inspection and subsequent retrieval 
warranted in-field inspection to verify as much of the confinement and configuration condition as possible 
prior to retrieving the drums. Lessons learned [3] f?om a DOE Type B investigation of worker uptakes at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory [4] concluded that packages containing radioactive material should be 
assumed unsafe until proven otherwise. 
The engineering assessment [I] discovered discrepancies among the historical documentation regarding 
the exact package configuration. Specifically, the SRS engineering drawing of the source capsule was not 
available in the Hanford Site records nor was it retrievable by SRS to allow for verification of the source 
capsule design. Other engineering drawings raised the possibility that the source capsule was of a 
different configuration and material. The possibility also existed that the source capsule was surrounded 
by felt rather than aluminum pellets. 
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Figure 1. Pu-238 Drum with birdcage and source capsule 
with nested aluminum cans of plutonium oxide. 
Figure 2. Burial Trench showing four tiers of waste containers. 
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Determination of the necessary precautions for safe handling began with an early engineering assessment 
[l]. The assessment included a review of the inner container materials and the potential impact on 
confinement resulting from senrice history. The assessment considered packaging details and records, 
service history of the package, corrosion, thermal aging, stress corrosion craclung, intergranular attack, 
and embrittlement. Given the expected configuration of the containers, the engineering assessment 
predicted one could reasonably expect container performance at the time of retrieval to match container 
performance at the time of packaging [I]. 
The purpose of the drum integrity inspection was to evaluate and confirm the confinement condition of 
the internal source capsule, packaging configuration, and provide insight into the material of construction 
fm the contents of each drum. The first three drums were inspected without removing the drums from 
their storage location in the array. This was to gain as much information as possible on the d m  
condition and configuration before operator handling of the drum. The soil overburden, plywood, and 
tarp were incrementally removed to expose only three drums at a time, as required by the physical 
security plan. Initially, three of the 12 drums were exposed, measured, and radiographed. A post job 
- ~ 
review was conducted and lessons learned factored into the planning for inspecting the remaining nine 
h-238 drums. 
Primary attributes for assessing confinement included radiation dose levels, presence of external 
contamination that had origmted from the source capsule, and temperature resulting from radiolytic 
decay. For example, the engineering assessment predicted an expected combined photon and neutron 
dose rate of approximately 0.23 to 0.26 mSv/hr [I]. Complete failure of the packaging was calculated to 
result in dose rates exceeding 15 mSv/hr. Pu-238 contamination, if found on the external surface of the 
drum in isotopic concentrations similar to that of the oxide contained within the source capsule, would be 
a clear indicator that confinement had failed. Heat from radiolyhc decay was predicted to be within 
5.7 'C of an adjacent container that has been stored in same environmental conditions. A higher 
differential temperature (AT) could indicate unexpected conditions inside the drum. 
After the confinement condition was verified for an individual drum, radiography was used to confirm the 
package configuration. Overpacking and above ground storage would proceed if all attributes were "as 
expected". After the drum was overpacked, it was placed in above ground storage awaiting future off-site 
shipment to SRS. The process was repeated until all 12 drums were inspected. 
Contingency Planning 
Since the purpose of drum integrity inspection was to c o n f m  confinement, field activities had to assume 
potential loss-of confinement. Th& ledto planning contingencies should loss of confinement be 
discovered. Potential hazards and unexwcted drum conditions were identified, analyzed. and 
contingency plans developed by an inter-disciplinary team consisting of repres&atives from the 
organizations: operation, radiation control, industrial health and safety, nuclear safety, and engineering. 
A logic diagram was prepared of the steps planned for inspection activities and included decision points 
based on the potential field condition of the drums. 
When expected conditions were verified, the decision point allowed the next step in the logic to proceed. 
If unexpected conditions were found, the decision point identified the needed contingency action. 
Contingency action planning involved the line organizations, thereby strengthening the thoroughness of 
the work planning and worker buy-in. 
Drum conditions included elevated dose rate, drum identification not identifiable, elevated drum 
temperature, corroded drum, drum not in expected position, bulging drum, damaged drum, contaminated 
drum, and drum configuration not as expected. 
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Complete or catastrophic failure of the internal packaging would be clearly indicated by a high radiation 
dose rate. In the case of catastrophic failure, the oxide would be repositioned from the inner containers to 
the bottom of the drum. The dose rate was estimated to increase by two orders of magnitude primarily 
from the Am-241 which had accumulated as a decay product in the oxide. However, the contingent 
actions recognized that partial failure of the confinement boundaries would produce field attributes lower 
than that for catastrophic failure (i.e., something less than the estimated two orders of magnitude increase 
in dose rate). 
Cautionary limits and decision points were set for dose rate, contamination, and temperature. If these 
limits were reached, then a management review committee (MRC) would review the field conditions and 
determine specific actions to respond to the field conditions. The members of MRC were the facility 
manager, the operations manager, the radiological control manager, and the engineering manager. 
~echnical disciplines from other support org&izations (e g., nuclear safety, industrial hygiene; and 
environmental compliance) would be consulted depending on the specific situation. 
For dose, a limit of 0.50 m S v h  on contact (total photon and neutron) was established for the field as a 
cautionary dose rate limit that, if reached, would temporarily halt inspection activities while the MRC 
reviewed the available data and provided further instruction to the field. The field may be directed to 
obtain further corroborating data. Since the predicted dose rate was estimated to be 0.23 to 0.26 mSv/hr, 
the 0.50 m S v h  limit was chosen by engineering as an indication that a confinement breach may have 
occurred warranting a review by the MRC before proceeding any further with inspection. The 0.50 
mSv/hr engineering limit was below the limit of 3.00 mSv1hr established in the radiation work permit as 
the maximum allowable dose rate for typical inspection activities. 
The cautionary limit for contamination was set at detectable levels. Isotopic analysis would be performed 
to verify if the source of contamination, either as PuOz or contamination from other drums in the array. 
A AT of 16.7 OC between a drum containing P u 4  and an adjacent drum was established as the cautionary 
limit that would invoke MRC action. Since the predicted AT was 5.7 "C, the established 16.7 OC 
provided an acceptable margin of error to account for uncertainties in the predicted value while 
maintaining worker safety. 
Potential drum conditions were assessed, measurable primary and secondary attributes preset, and 
potential actions determined if preset cautionary limits were exceeded. If a drum exceeded a cautionary 
limit, two possible conclusions were possible: 1) the exceeded attribute did not by itself identify a failed 
inner container and further evaluation was needed or 2) the exceeded attribute indicated a failed inner 
container and an Unreviewed Safety Question and Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis 
determination was required. The planning also recognized that these cautionary limits could occur 
independently or in combination. For example, since the source of heat was primarily from the decay of 
the Pu-238 within the PuOz, there should have been a corresponding increase in dose rate with an 
excessive increase in AT. 
Possible confinement and configuration conditions, and potential response actions were reviewed with the 
field workers and management. These potential response actions were simulated and practiced prior to 
starting the actual inspection activity in the field. 
One contingency was independent of drum condition. During deployment or retrieval of the radiography 
source, the source itself could become stuck in an unshielded position between its shielded case and the 
collimator. Since the maximum allowable source the radiographer was licensed to use was 3.7 El2 Bq of 
II-192, the estimated dose rate of an unshielded soutce was estimated to be 6.0 Svkr at 30 cm. This full 
dose rate would also occur during the normal three seconds it took for the source to travel to or from its 
shielded case to the collimator. If this source became stuck between these two points, then contingency 
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actions would be required by the radiographer, per his Nuclear Regulatory Commission license, to 
recover the stuck source. 
As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Considerations 
The use of radiography as a part of drum retrieval was new to LLBG operations. Therefore, 
radiographing the Pu-238 drums was preceded by radiographing a non-radioactive drum (mockup) that 
was representative of a Pu-238 drum. The decision to proceed with radiographing the Pu-238 drums 
depended on the successful radiographing of the mockup. The purpose of radiographing a mockup was to 
demonstrate that radiographic techniques would yield useful information prior to deploying radiography 
services in the LLBG and to minimize experimentation while in the trench. If successful, cycle times for 
setup, exposure, and film developing would be factored into the work planning and hazard analyses. 
The rahographic equipment was assembled at the Waste Retrieval Project Simulated Test Site. Here the 
off-site contractor performing radiography familiarized the Fluor Hmford personnel from operation, 
radiation control, and engineering with the safety boundaries, access control requirements during 
radiography, and the operation of the radiography equipment. Special training of the radiation control 
technicians was provided by the subcontractor to familiarize them with the radiography source equipment. 
Responses to a potential stuck source were simulated, and the interaction between the radiographer, field 
personnel, and the MRC were practiced as a part of contingency planning. In addition, responses to 
contingency actions were simulated for an elevated dose rate and a bulged drum. Through the job hazard 
analysis and radiological work screening processes, it was determined that placing an earth benn to shield 
the radiographer's exposed source was the most effective way to shield workers during normal and 
unexpected conditions. 
Understanding the risks, identifying contingent actions, and practicing the response to these potential 
conditions served two ALARA purposes for both normal and unexpected events. First, in the event of an 
unexpected condition, contingent actions would keep radiation exposures to a minimum. Second, the 
operators, radiation control technicians, and the radiography contractor learned each others' roles and 
responsibilities during normal and unexpected conditions. 
RESULTS 
While engineered drawings for the source capsule were unavailable, the radiographs agreed with 
historical correspondence and criticality documentation. Radiation dose and temperature data were 
within the values predicted by earlier engineering calculations [I]. 
The 12 drums were packaged by the same generator; were limited in number; and had experienced the 
same environmental.conditions. While in all likelihood the condition of the remaining nine drums would 
be similar to the first three drums inspected, protecting the immediate workers still remained the focus 
during inspection activities. The approach for the remaining nine drums remained fundamentally the 
same, except where field conditions or operational improvements warranted modification to the work 
instructions. 
Based on the inspection results of the initial three drums, work instructions were modified to account for 
changing conditions. For example, the soil overburden and surrounding drums provided shielding during 
radiography. However, as more drums were uncovered and removed to provide access tothe remaining 
Pu-238 drums, shielding was gradually lost. To maintain dose rate control as the surrounding shielding 
was removed, the work instructions were modified to allow the drum to be moved to a location on tier 4 
of the array where shielding would still be adequate for radiography. The drum was moved only if dose, 
contamination, and temperature were within expected values. 
Page 8 of 13 
6320-KNF-27217-Rev1 .doc 
Page 15 of 19 of DAD1677549 
.. . 
PI[-238 Drrinr Dose Rnte @ Corrtnd - Exposed Face ( n ~ S v / h )  1 
I PU-238 Drum Terttpmtrrrr Sirrnmary - Exposed Fam ("C) 1
Page 10of 13 , I 
6320-HNF-27217-Rw~ .dm 
Page 17 of 19 of DA01677549 
' 
WM'06 Conference, February 26 - March 2,2006, Tucson, A 2  
to the future, Hanford's TRU Waste Retrieval Project has identified 50 distinct waste streams of which 
over 20 waste streams have unique characteristics, and more will likely be identified as retrieval 
progresses. The thorough planning also validated the merit of worker involvement since it played a key 
role in determining how to address each contingency and perform the inspections. 
Other DOE sites having a similar history of storing TRU waste generated on-site and off-site will 
experience analogous challenges and will benefit from applying a similar planning rigor for significant, 
unknown conditions. Elements of the engineering and operational rigor can be modified and 
appropriately applied to the unique characteristics of other TRU wastes at Hanford and other DOE sites. 
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Figure 3. Radiograph photograph of the top of a source 
capsule, vent plug, and nested aluminum cans. 
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Figure 4. Radiograph photograph of the bottom of a source 
capsule, the plutonium oxide, and a shipping container. 
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